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A CIVILIAN LAWYER LOOKS AT COMMON LAW
PROCEDURE*
Konstantinos D. Kerameus**

Introduction
In the years since World War II there has been an increasing
tendency among lawyers to look beyond their own fences. In 1953,
the late Professor F.H. Lawson delivered his Cooley lectures at Michigan under the title "A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law." '
Ten years later, Professor Abram Chayes gave his Vanderbilt lecture
under the heading "A Common Lawyer Looks at International Law." 2
In this text, a civilian lawyer tries to look at common law procedure.
How is it that cool-thinking lawyers have been attracted by the
temptations of visual adventures? While the growing interest in foreign
legal systems may well be attributed to the dramatic increase of transnational transactions, this empirical parameter to the rise of comparative legal studies accounts only for part of the explanation. The other
part, at least equally important, is related to the expectation of obtaining a deeper knowledge of one's own legal system through the
comparison with different legal conceptions and principles. 3 We look
at foreign law also for the sake of our own law. This look over the
border is both rewarding and refreshing. It enables us to look back
at the working of our own rules, that is, at the same problems of
man and society, with a better appreciation of the respective strengths
and weaknesses of our system.
Understanding the study of foreign law as a means of gaining
insight into our own law as well should easily integrate the following
observations into the John H. Tucker, Jr. lectures in civil law. Comparison has been a major modern aspiration of the civilian tradition.
From the perspective of European systems of civil procedure, no other
Copyright 1987, by
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Professor of Civil Procedure, Athens University School of Law.
1. University of Michigan Law School (1953).
2. 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1396 (1965).
3. See, e.g., R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law, Cases-Text-Materials 18-25 (4th
ed. 1980) [hereinafter Schlesinger]: "The Foreign Solution As A Contrast Or A Means
of Gaining Perspective"; H. Steiner and D. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems,
Materials and Text 218-19, 227 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Steiner and Vagts].
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comparison can be as fruitful and instructive as the comparison with
the rich repository of experience represented by the common law.
An across-the-systems comparison of civil procedural patterns,
though neglected in the initial steps of modern research, has begun in
recent years to open encouraging paths. As lawyers, we should be
grateful for the increased degree of attention paid to the working of
judicial mechanisms. As pointed out recently, "[olur notion of a legal
system, our very concept of law, most of our jurisprudential and
political debates about the nature of law, are profoundly related to
the work of the judiciary. ' 4 Therefore, if comparison is to go beyond
certain theoretical elaborations, and to aim at producing meaningful
results which could appeal not only to scholars but to practicing lawyers
as well, one must focus on the administration of justice.
This is even more the case in a comparison between the civil law
and the common law. Among the many factors which contribute to
the development of the common law, contemporary analysis emphasizes
the role of the judge.' The judge is considered to be not only the
prime pronouncer of legal precepts, but also the most central actor in
a common law jurisdiction-to be contrasted to the professor in the
6
Germanic legal family, or the advocate in the Romanistic legal family.
Common law judges loom before Continental eyes across the narrow
but deeply significant Channel, or the wide zone of the North Atlantic,
as powerful dignitaries of the law, cautiously and skillfully holding it
together. From the opposite viewpoint, American legal writing, so far
as it deals with European developments, tends to view Continental
judges as mere civil servants. 7 Such a generalizing contradistinction is,
however, too abstract and too simplistic to be useful. Comparison
must descend to a lower and more specific level and focus not so
much on the personality of the judge, but rather on the actual ways
and means of handling civil disputes. Within this framework, I will
try then to approach from a civilian perspective some of the most
distinctive features of common law procedure. I will limit my inquiry
to procedural patterns in the United States in the context of civil
litigation, leaving aside the vast and rapidly evolving area of criminal
procedure. My aim is not to offer a full-fledged comparison between
the two systems, but simply to highlight some salient features of
American civil procedure piled up around the judge, his power and
function, as they appear to lawyers nourished in the civilian tradition.

4. Steiner and Vagts, supra note 3, at 226.
5. Cf. Rheinstein, Die Rechtshonoratioren und ihr Einfluss auf Charakter und
Funktion der Rechtsordnungen, 34 Rabels Z 1, 2-5 (1970).
6. Cf. I Zweigert and Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 63 (1977).
7. Schlesinger, supra note 3, at 183-85.
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Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional issues surround the commencement of litigation in
all legal systems. The importance of these issues is even more pronounced in the United States, where jurisdiction, especially jurisdiction
to adjudicate, relies on extremely detailed considerations, and often
makes up a large portion of the subject matter in hard-core courses,
such as civil procedure, 8 federal courts, and admiralty. This importance
is certainly attributable in part to the federal structure of the country.
Constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction, particularly the
elaborate jurisprudential ramifications of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, account for a good percentage of the cases
and the other legal discussion involving jurisdictional issues. Nevertheless, similar questions, although more limited in importance and
numbers, arise within the federal court system as well, at least with
regard to restrictions on service of process. 9 Under rule 4(f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a]ll process other than a subpoena
may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in
which the district court is held ..

. ."

Thus, the whole discussion

about the defendant's physical presence within the district or the existence of minimum contacts with the forum may resurge to a certain
extent within the federal court system as well.10
This preoccupation with territorial connections between the forum,
the cause of action, and the defendant found a classic expression in
Justice Holmes's statement that "[tihe foundation of jurisdiction is
physical power."'" Modern scholarship offers more nuanced rationalizations, identifying the general interest in securing compliance with
the law and efficiency in its enforcement as the psychological and
political bases for such a jurisdictional approach. 2 Yet, regardless of
the motivation, it becomes apparent that in the United States, locating
the proper court in a civil action does not always depend on preestablished abstract concepts, but often requires a painstaking inquiry

8. Cf., for instance, the 216 pages (59-275), or about 19.30 of the whole book,
devoted to jurisdiction in J. Cound, J.Friedenthal and A. Miller, Civil Procedure,
Cases and Materials (3d ed. 1980), as opposed to the respective 49 pages (154-203), or
about 4.3o of the whole book in L. Rosenberg and K.H. Schwab, Zivilprozessrecht
(13th ed. 1981).
9.

See F. James and G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 69 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter

James and Hazard].
10. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d
1266 (9th Cir. 1981); Samuels v. BMW of North America, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1191

(E.D. Tex. 1983); Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp.
312 (D. Md. 1983).
11. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, 37 S. Ct. 343, 344 (1917).
12. James and Hazard, supra note 9, at 111-12.
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into whether, in the particular case, there exist minimum contacts
between the forum, the cause of action, and the defendant. Since the
prevailing test focuses on "sufficient contacts or ties with the state of
the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to
enforce the obligations,"" then jurisdiction over the defendant is not a
self-evident link established on general lines, but rather a highly individualized structure of authority"' which requires in each case verification in accordance with the particular factual context.
This persistent reliance of American civil procedure upon the gravity
and relevance of connections in the particular case is in stark contrast
with European jurisdictional conceptions. On the Continent, adjudicatory jurisdiction is based either on the domicile of the defendant
or, in special cases, on other connections between the cause of action
and the territory of the court. Jurisdiction based on domicile is called
"general jurisdiction" and encompasses even causes of action otherwise
unrelated to the forum."' The other types of jurisdiction are called
"special jurisdictions,' ' 6 as, for instance, in actions pertaining to performance, breach or rescission of contracts, which may be brought at
the place where the contract is to be performed, or actions for wrongful
conduct, which may be brought at the place where the conduct occurred. Thus, continental law considers the defendant's domicile as an
appropriate place of litigation for all purposes, and the place of contractual performance as a proper forum for any suit pertaining to the
contract, even if, in the particular circumstances, that place has no
other connection with the dispute. For example, the Supreme Court
of Switzerland held that a suit must be brought at the defendant's
domicile, even if all meaningful connections point to another forum. 7
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is not part of the civilian

13. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S. Ct.
154, 160 (1945).
14. See M. Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure,
84 Yale L.J. 480 (1975).
15. In a similar sense, the term "general jurisdiction" has been recently adopted
by the United States Supreme Court: Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9, 415, 418 n.12, 421 n.l, 423, 424, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872 n.9,
1873, 1874 n.12, 1876 n.1, 1876-77, (1984); Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 105 S. Ct. 2174,
2182 n.15 (1985).
16. Characteristically, the same distinction between general jurisdiction and special
jurisdiction was also used in the Brussels Convention of September 27, 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 2
ff., 5 ff.
17. Decision of September 28, 1966, BGE 92 I 201, at 203-04; subsequently confirmed by decision of March 22, 1967, BGE 93 I 29, at 37 under c. Cf. Liver, 104
Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 31-34 (1968).
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tradition. The civil law system simply attempts to identify in advance
an appropriate nexus for asserting jurisdiction in most cases, but with
full awareness that such nexus may be less proper in some cases. This
is a deliberate policy choice in favor of legal certainty and the speedy
resolution of preliminary jurisdictional issues, at the expense perhaps
of individual equity.
Compared to this clear, yet flat and non-distinguishing Continental
attitude, the elaborate American search for sufficient contacts appears
as an overwhelming concern for individualized justice, even at the
expense of certainty and predictability. It is certainly true that, in the
vast majority of cases, the jurisdictional situation is so clear that the
court finds it unnecessary to deal specifically with jurisdictional issues.
However, precisely because of the dramatic expansion of the scope of
jurisdiction in the last three or four decades, the relevant and most
common question today is not whether any further expansion is necessary, but rather whether the connecting factors relied upon by the
plaintiff are truly sufficient to support the exercise of judicial power.
Thus, although perhaps marginal in a statistical sense, the most celebrated cases indulge in a detailed examination, unknown in the civil
law world, of numerous individual facts for purely jurisdictional purposes. It does not seem that the due process clause alone can explain
this difference in approach. Similar constitutional provisions in Europe
have not supported even a superficially similar treatment of jurisdictional issues. It is perhaps not accidental that, in the United States,
the minimum contacts test was introduced under the label of a quest
for "substantial justice."' 8 Thus, even procedural due process is enriched by substantive, or at least not-merely-procedural considerations.
American notions of establishing adjudicatory jurisdiction invite a scrutiny of defendants and causes of action on a case-by-case basis and
in a manner not disassociated from a contemplation of the merits.
Discovery
Pretrial discovery and deposition procedures have been hailed as
an important feature of twentieth century American developments. With
the re-formulation and expansion of the devices and sanctions of
discovery through the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the concept of a formal preparation for trial, as far as the ascertainment
of the relevant facts is concerned, became an integral part of American
civil procedure. Parties are now required not only to disclose facts
pertaining to the case of the party seeking discovery, but also to disclose

18. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S. Ct.
154, 160 (1945).
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evidence needed for their defense. Pretrial discovery prolongs the process of taking of evidence, and dilutes the notion of a single concentrated
trial. Under the federal rules of discovery, the trial becomes simpler
and more predictable through the prior scrutiny of much of the evidence. In fact, trial may often become superfluous, since the awareness
of the available evidence and the elimination of fictitious issues may
encourage out of court settlement. 9
From a broader comparative perspective, one could make two
general remarks about modern discovery. First, this gradual and mutual
preparation of evidence is a significant and perhaps inevitable deviation
from the notion of a single highly concentrated trial under traditional
common law. It was once possible to accumulate all of the evidence
in a single day in court, and to have an all-sided, synthetical, and
balanced evaluation of it. However, the growing complexity of contemporary litigation has exceeded the boundaries of such accommodation. Presenting evidence in a complicated antitrust suit, or in a tort
case involving an air crash, in a single day in court, without any
previous glimpse at documents and witnesses and without any precise
delineation of the evidentiary issues, may well amount to an exercise
in futility, in that it may exceed the intellectual grasp of both court
and counsel. Although an overall view of the evidentiary material is,
of course, still desirable, practical necessity seems to have imposed
this progressive unfolding of the evidence.
Developments in Europe have gone the opposite way. Since early
modern times, civil proceedings on the Continent have unraveled in a
series of consecutive stages. 20 There has never been a highly concentrated and dramatic trial in the common-law sense of the word. The
general traditional perception has been that the disclosure of the truth
is served better by a system of gradual procedural ripening of the
evidentiary material, based on a continuous cooperation between the
court and the parties, with the court considering the relevancy of party
allegations and ordering the taking of appropriate evidence, and the
parties offering step by step their methods of proof. Therefore, the
question frequently asked by American lawyers as to how the Continental system may function efficiently without pretrial devices may
be answered by recalling that such devices are simply unnecessary in
countries where the trial itself consists of consecutive stages: what is

19. On purposes and consequences of discovery, see W. Glaser, Pretrial Discovery
and the Adversary System (1968).
20. Cf. B. Kaplan, A.T. von Mehren and R. Schaefer, Phases of German Civil
Procedure, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1211-12 (1958); A.T. von Mehren, The Significance
for Procedural Practice and Theory of the Concentrated Trial: Comparative Remarks,
2 Europuaisches Rechtsdenken in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Festschrift fuur Helmut
Coing Jum 70 Geburtstag 361-71 (1982).
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in the United States a pretrial device is part of the regular trial method
on the Continent. In recent decades, however, there has been a movement towards concentration of the trial, evidenced by the requirement
that, at least in one-member courts, the parties must present all evidence
21
in a single hearing of the case.
Thus, having started from polar opposites, American and European
conceptions currently seem to be on a course of convergence. On this
side of the Atlantic, the original concentration of the trial seems to
be diluted, while on the Continent the advantages of presenting the
evidence in a single hearing are being gradually recognized.
The second remark pertains to the function and power of the judge
under modern discovery rules. Since the traditional common law approach of a concentrated trial was closely connected to the so-called
"sporting theory" of justice, 22 deconcentration by means of pretrial
devices rolls back the absolutely passive role of the judge who used
to be a mere arbiter of the parties' contest. Indeed, the mechanics of
discovery, as well as the pretrial conference and pretrial orders, presuppose a more active participation by the judge. 2 The degree of
participation depends on the exigencies and peculiarities of the particular case. Again, this enhancement of the power of the commonlaw judge through pretrial devices is more of an attempt to do justice
in the case at bar, than to promote general policies in contemplation
of the future.
Admissibility of Evidence
Besides discovery procedures, the other striking feature of common
law rules of evidence pertains, of course, to the rules governing its
admissibility. Traditional American doctrine distinguishes between two
kinds of exclusionary rules: first, rules designed to "enhance truthseeking by excluding weak evidence, prejudicial evidence, or other
evidence that is somehow disruptive of an orderly inquiry into past
events"; 24 the hearsay rule constitutes the best example of this first
group. The second group attempts to protect, under the name of
privileges, certain extrinsic societal values which are considered so
important as not only to tolerate, but also to require, restraints on
the search for the truth. These values may flow directly from the
Constitution, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, or may

21. Typical in this respect is article 270 (as amended, effective March 1, 1985) of
the Greek Code of Civil Procedure.
22. James and Hazard, supra note 9, at 227.
23. See generally id. at 265-70.
24. R. Lempert and S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence, Text, Problems,
Transcripts and Cases 645 (2d ed. 1982) [hereinafter Lempert and Saltzburg].
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be designed to protect other values, such as free communication, the
uninhibited development of favored relationships, or the effective functioning of governmental institutions. 25 Professional, relational, or public-authority privileges are to a greater or lesser extent known to most
European systems of civil procedure. However, the first group of
exclusionary rules, and especially the prohibition of introducing hearsay
26
evidence, usually do not have counterparts in the civilian world.
According to Wigmore, the hearsay rule is the "most characteristic
rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence-a rule which may be
esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contribution of that eminently
practical legal system to the world's methods of procedure." 27 It may
well be that, historically as well as functionally, the hearsay rule is
closely connected to the development of the jury system. 2s - As uninformed laymen were charged with the task of ascertaining facts of
which they had no immediate knowledge, it became necessary to develop
safety devices which would protect jurors from the uncertainties of
forensic impressions. Today, the connection between hearsay and jury
trial is reflected in the presumption that the trial judge, sitting without
29
a jury, disregards all inadmissible evidence in reaching his decision.
In spite of recent relaxation, American rules on the admissibility
of evidence go far beyond Continental bars to information offered to
the courts. In this respect, the difference of approach was initially
purely historical. Europe had lived for centuries under a rigid system
of a quantitative evaluation of witnesses and their evidence. As Wigmore puts it, there were rules "declaring (for example) one witness
upon personal knowledge to be equal to two or three going upon
hearsay." 30 One of the major objectives of the great procedural codifications on the Continent in the early nineteenth century was the
elimination of these formal restraints upon judicial activity." Free

25. 5 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials At Common Law 28 (Chadbourne rev. 1974)
[hereinafter Wigmore].
26. See, e.g., Schlesinger, supra note 3, at 397 n.26.
27. See, e.g., J. Weinstein, J. Mansfield, N. Abrams and M. Berger, Cases and
Materials on Evidence 1325 (7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams
and Berger).
28. See C. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 244, at 579 (2d ed.
1972).
29. See, e.g., Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger, supra note 27, at 120910. See also Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377,
379 (8th Cir. 1950), where the court stated: "In the trial of a nonjury case, it is
virtually impossible for a trial judge to commit reversible error by receiving incompetent
evidence, whether objected to or not."
30. Wigmore, supra note 25, at 16 n.25.
31. See R.C. van Caenegem, History of European Civil Procedure, in 16 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Ch. 2, at 87, 89 (1971).
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evaluation of evidence was hailed as the all-sweeping principle, empowering the judge to ponder, in each particular case, contrasting
means of proof. Among other things, this principle rendered obsolete
the rules of admissibility, which, like all mechanical rules of proof,
were primarily geared towards witnesses with indirect or suspect knowledge of the relevant facts. Rules on admissibility were in principle no
longer compatible with the high degree of confidence placed in the
judge appropriately to assess evidentiary matters.
Here again, as with discovery,3 2 the disparity between the systems
on the two sides of the Atlantic has been gradually decreasing. In a
movement centripetally convergent to the relaxation of exclusionary
rules in the United States, some European courts have been insisting
increasingly on distinguishing between admissibility and evaluation of
evidence, by stressing that the latter depends on, rather than obviates,
the former. Yet, there remain significant differences between the two
systems which should not be minimized. In the United States, the
exclusionary rules are designed to improve, rather than to prevent,
fact-finding.3 3 Indeed, they appear to do so in the vast majority of
cases. They are also value-oriented in the sense that they are attached
to the quest for truth, which is a central value in any procedural
system. However, by over-emphasizing the ordinary course of human
behavior and engaging in a pre-categorization of evidence into typical
situations, the exclusionary rules inevitably neglect the peculiarities of
specific cases. I submit that by restricting the admissibility of evidence,
American law perceives the judicial function as a general method of
resolving disputes, rather than as an individualized process of satisfying
particular needs.
Trial By Jury
Connected to the hearsay rule, but much broader in its reach, trial
by jury appears to the outsider as the single most important feature
of common law procedure. This is more true of America than of
England. For, although England provided the historical roots of the
institution, the United States added to it both a constitutional guarantee
and a political dimension. The seventh amendment, supplemented also
by nearly all state constitutions, preserves the right of trial by jury
and prevents the courts from reexamining the jury's determination of
the facts. By virtue of its elevation to constitutional rank, but also
by its own merits, the right to a jury trial has always been regarded

32. See text accompanying supra notes 19-23.
33. See, e.g., Lempert and Saltzburg, supra note 24; Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams
and Berger, supra note 27.
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in America as "a symbol of popular participation in the administration
of justice.''34
It may be worth recalling, however, that the constitutional sanctioning of the jury system hinges on what would seem to be a historical
technicality. The Constitution of the United States, as well as the state
constitutions, did not introduce an all-encompassing right of the people
to administer justice. They merely preserved the right to a jury trial
as it existed in English law in 1791 when the seventh amendment was
adopted, or at the date of the respective adoption of the state constitutions. Since in England only actions at law, as distinguished from
suits in equity, were tried before a jury, the historical test required
by the Constitution depends on whether the remedy or the right at
hand is analogous to a common law action, or rather to an equitable
remedy. This distinction became even more technical when common
law and equity were merged. Since then, actions derived from common
law and actions derived from equity have been tried in all other
significant respects alike, except for the participation of a jury in the
former, but not in the latter.
Finally, one should not forget that the broad political perception
of the jury trial as a deliberate method of immediate popular participation in the administration of justice is probably weakened by the
uniform construction that the right to a jury may be waived by the
parties.35 Nonetheless, in spite of historical fortuities or the other
limitations mentioned, the jury system came of age in the common
law world, and has been preserved in the United States as a reasonable
way of tying the administration of justice to the conceptions and
expectations of the community at large.
For all its rich cultural heritage, Europe has not enjoyed in this
respect the benefit of a continuous and smooth evolution. The complex
structures of Roman law, received by most of Europe in the early
Modern ages, required extensive legal training and made necessary the
entrustment of the whole judicial system to professional judges. Against
this traditional background, even the French Revolution and nineteenthcentury liberalism could not attain lay participation, except with respect
to certain felonies. Private law rules have always been considered asand perhaps made-too technical and refined to be properly understood
by laymen. Even the participation of lay assessors in district courts
for commercial matters is now in retreat. A lay element does appear
in the Federal Republic of Germany, where lay judges sit with professional judges in the labor courts as well as in the commercial district
courts; however, these judges are full members of the court, voting

34.

James and Hazard, supra note 9, at 421.

35. For a modern expression of this idea, see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), (d).
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on both legal and factual issues. 36 The most recent lay involvement in
the administration of justice took the form of the so-called "alternative" methods of dispute resolution. In an attempt to reduce court
delays and to bring judicial mechanisms nearer to the people's understanding, small claims, consumer protection, or neighborhood disputes are relegated to a rather amorphous adjudication conducted by
laymen. Progress is, however, limited and slow, if only because of the
century-long estrangement of nonlawyers from the administration of
justice.
To most European observers, lay involvement in adjudication tends
to promote decision-making in accordance with the peculiarities and
the needs of the particular case, yet often at the cost of insensibility
to general legal precepts and to predictability of result. For example,
if persuaded on the merits of the claim, lay judges would probably
be more prone to overrule an exception of liberative prescription, thus
undermining the role of prescription in fostering legal certainty. The
impact of such emotion-driven judgments on subsequent cases cannot
be underestimated. The pursuit of justice adapted to individual configurations requires a delineation of jury trial removed as far as possible
from the purely historical test. In Ross v. Bernhard,3 7 the Supreme
Court of the United States indicated a similar approach by pointing
out "the practical abilities and limitations of juries." 3
Joinder of Parties and Class Actions
The problem of the appropriate and/or necessary parties to an
action opens an inviting field for comparing American and European
conceptions, especially with respect to the scope and number of parties
present before the court, or the parties to be bound by its decision.3 9
As compared to European systems, American civil procedure expands
the circle of parties joined in the trial, or subject to the effects of
the judgment. The principle that some parties must be included in an
action either as plaintiffs or defendants-the so-called "necessary parties" rule-although not unknown on the Continent, is more prevalent
in the United States, both in scope and actual operation. In Europe,
parties are qualified as necessary mainly when their non-involvement
would prevent any adjudication at all, as for example in an action

36. See, e.g., E. Kern and M. Wolff, Gerichtsverfassungsrecht § 23, at 150-58 (5th
ed. 1975). See generally M. Cappelletti, Laienrichter -heute?, Festschrift fuur Fritz Baur
313-27 (1981).

37.

396 U.S. 531, 90 S.Ct. 733 (1970).

38. Id. at 538 n.10, 90 S. Ct. at 738 n.10.
39. For a comparative treatment, see E.J. Cohn, Parties, in 16 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Ch. 5 (1976).
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for partition which does not name all co-owners as parties. A desire
to avoid inconsistent judgments may justify additional instances of
classifying parties as necessary; yet, failure to join these parties does
not result in a bar to the action. Moreover, the concept of inconsistent
judgments as a basis for the necessary parties rule is construed narrowly, covering situations in which a separate procedural treatment of
various parties is excluded by rigid legal rules rather than by considerations of expediency. Thus, the necessary-parties rule is regarded in
Europe as a means of obviating legal obstacles rather than of affirmatively promoting justice, of averting evil rather than producing good.
The converse seems to be true in the United States, where the rule
seems to be based on the traditional equitable principle of attaining
"complete justice by deciding upon and settling the rights of all persons
interested in the subject of the suit ...;for a court of equity in all
40
cases delights to do complete justice, and not by halves."
This active approach to the delineation of necessary parties is
supplemented by a case-by-case assessment of the relevant factors. For
instance, in deciding whether absentees should be joined in the proceedings, the protection of absentees, of present parties, or of society's
interest, and plaintiff's access to a forum are carefully weighted on
an ad hoc basis rather than by resort to pre-established and rigid
rules. 4' Thus, completeness of adjudication depends upon the discretion
of the judge, and may encompass highly varying circles of interested
persons.
A civilian lawyer tends to place class actions within this broader
understanding of necessary parties. Indeed, he views the whole institution of class action as a crossroad of several typical American law
avenues, rather than as an isolated phenomenon of random reaction.
The first of these avenues is purely historical: the long established wide
scope of necessary parties had prepared the soil well for an organic
blossom of the class action; as the relentlessly growing numbers of
necessary parties began to make the traditional rule unworkable, the
intellectual climate was ready to accept a modern joinder scheme. The
second avenue runs through the peculiar American tendency to deal
with legal problems in inseparable conjunction with social realities.
This pragmatic approach may explain why residency in the same neighborhood, or the suffering of a common wrong are regarded as sufficient
links for constituting a class for litigation purposes. Adequacy of
representation within the class is determined by equally pragmatic
considerations. Finally, the optimistic American belief in law and the

40. F. Calvert, A Treatise Upon the Law Respecting Parties to Suits in Equity 3,
2 (1837).
41. See, e.g., James and Hazard, supra note 9, at 532-44.
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court system as a fitting and almost omnipotent vehicle for remedying
social needs and expanding justice42 has also supported the unique
development of class suits. Class actions were the response of the legal
system to the civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's, the
consumer movement of the 1960's and 1970's, 43 and the environmental
protection movement of the 1970's and 1980's. Only a high degree of
confidence in the efficiency of the judicial process is likely to allow
large-scale procedural answers to high-stakes factual problems.
Appellate Review
A superficial comparison of appellate review on both sides of the
Atlantic" would immediately identify one structural similarity: in both
systems, appellate courts are set on two levels, the first consisting of
the intermediate appellate courts, such as the circuit courts in the
federal judiciary, and the second consisting of supreme courts, or courts
of final resort. Nevertheless, behind this formal resemblance at least
two substantial disparities can be identified. First, in a common law
jurisdiction appeals are usually on the record, which, in the formula
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), means that "[flindings of
fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." On the other hand, civilian intermediate
appeals are both on the law and the facts, thus opening a much wider
scope of review: not only may findings of fact in the court of original
jurisdiction be re-evaluated on appeal and modified or overturned on
the same evidentiary record, but also new evidence, to a large extent
new factual allegations, and to a restricted extent even new claims
may be introduced on appeal. In short, a civilian court of intermediate
appeal has potentially the same power over the subject matter as the
trial court. Many civilian countries adhere to the so-called rule of
"double jurisdiction," in the sense that, in principle, any case deserves
a double chance of judicial examination, on both legal and factual
issues. The second substantial difference between the two systems concerns the question of whether the final resort to the respective supreme
court is a matter of right or of judicial discretion in each particular
case. Civilian procedure adopts the former, common law procedure
the latter point of view.

42. See, lately, L. Cohen-Tanugi, Le droit sans ' aetat-Sur la democratie en
France et en Amerique, especially at 59-166 (1985).
43. Cf. James and Hazard, supra note 9, at 563. See also M. Cappelletti, La
protection d'int aerets collectifs et de groupe dans le proces civil (Maetamorphoses de
la procaedure civile), Revue internationale de droit compare 571-97 (1975).
44. See P. Herzog and D. Karlen, Attacks on Judicial Decisions, in 16 International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Ch. 8 (1982).
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Like in other areas of law, dissimilarities in appellate review are
perhaps not as accentuated today as they once were. With regard to
the scope of review, there may be some retreat from the classical rule
in the United States and an extension of appellate review to some
questions of fact; nevertheless, this is borne out more in scholarly
writing than in actual cases. 45 As far as final appeals are concerned,
German law has recently made resort to the supreme court dependent
upon the discretion, either of the intermediate appellate court, or of
the supreme court itself, if the appellant is aggrieved for more than
40.000 DM (approx. U.S. $20,000). 4 6 Yet, the main features of discrepancy loom large. In a civilian jurisdiction, the law-fact distinction
runs along the line between the supreme court on the one hand, and
the courts of first instance and intermediate appellate courts on the
other; in a common law jurisdiction, the line runs between all appellate
courts on the one hand and the trial courts on the other. This common
treatment of all appellate courts, as distinguished from the trial courts,
is not only a matter of terminology or convenience, but also produces
important practical consequences in terms of precedential value, style
and reporting of opinions, as well as in the staffing of the courts
with, for example, law clerks. Yet, a civilian lawyer is much more
accustomed to expect a wide degree of conformity in individual cases
between the decisions of trial and intermediate appellate courts; he is
therefore likely to regard as inappropriate the common law upgrading,
and at the same time confinement, of intermediate appellate courts to
the upper end of the judiciary.
The dissimilarities described above point to a different allocation
of functions to appellate review in both systems. In Europe, intermediate appellate review is but a second, most often de novo, examination of the case by more experienced judges, a sort of instinctive
response to the awareness of human fallibility. Because they have
potentially the same power of inquiry into the dispute as the trial
courts, the intermediate appellate courts in Europe have less of an
impact on the community than their common law counterparts. Only
the appellate courts of last resort, which are restricted to questions of
law, may claim to shape the life of the law in the whole country.
Despite the lack of a stare decisis doctrine, such expectations are in
most cases fulfilled. The moral influence of supreme court decisions
falls only slightly short of the formally binding force attached to

45. Cf., e.g., Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 Wash. U.L.Q. 409 (1981),
as opposed to Pullmann-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781 (1982).
46. §§ 546, 554b German Code of Civil Procedure. See Baumbach/Lauterbach/
Albers/Hartmann, Zivilprozessordnung 1179, 1200 (43d ed. 1985).
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judicial precedents in the common law world. Yet, from a pragmatic
viewpoint, the impact of these decisions tends to be reduced by another
factor. By unqualifiedly regarding final appeals as a matter of right,
and by not utilizing any screening devices, the civilian system aspires
for too much and attains too little: supreme court dockets are overloaded, and selective elaboration on crucial or sensitive areas does not
seem feasible. Methods of appeal are viewed more as means for parties
to vindicate their rights, than as vehicles for the courts to mold general
policies.
To a Continental observer, the most distinctive feature of the
common law appellate review is its progressive limitation of the scope
of review. This limitation is achieved on the intermediate appellate
level through the law-fact distinction, and on the supreme court level
by entrusting the court with a high degree of discretion. Through the
first elimination, intermediate appellate courts are relieved from most
factual preoccupations, and become almost pure, though not final,
arbiters of the law. In exchange, or perhaps because of this limitation,
they reach a much broader audience. Similarly, by permitting the
supreme court to choose the cases it Will hear based on their overall
significance, the common law invites a programmed delineation of the
areas in which the supreme court finds some judicial pronouncement
desirable, appropriate, or even necessary, and thus transforms the
supreme court from a passive reactor to party applications, to an active
designer of judicial policy. In sum, by assigning to each level in the
court system a distinct scope of examination or review, common law
procedure encourages the individuality of each court and facilitates its
contribution in the shaping of the law and in the bringing about of
social change.
Epilogue
A comprehensive comparison between the procedural law of two
of the great legal families in the world should, of course, encompass
other issues as well. Elaboration and style in drafting judicial decisions
and dissenting opinions, issue preclusion, and the actual operation of
stare decisis are among the issues deserving such separate treatment
which, however, could not be undertaken here. Nevertheless, even the
cursory examination of the few issues which have been considered here
tends to suggest that, although procedural problems can be answered
in many different ways, from the multiplicity of the answers often
emerge convergent trends. Some of these trends can and should, in
the years to come, be strengthened through extensive study and mutual
understanding. By way of contrast, other dissimilarities seem too inherent in the respective systems to be eliminated in the near future.
They are part of the price we have to pay for the diversity of the
contemporary world.
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The themes which have been treated here cover the whole spectrum
from irreducible differences to gradually diminishing deviations. The
most striking example of the former category is trial by jury, as dictated
in the United States in its current form by both historical tradition
and constitutional provisions. Similarly, the dissimilarities described in
connection with jurisdiction over the person and class actions seem to
reflect an essentially different understanding of judicial authority and
of the very function of civil procedure. On the other hand, some rules
deriving from, or related to, trial by jury, like those pertaining to the
admissibility of evidence or the scope of appellate review, exhibit a
greater degree of flexibility and reveal some signs of convergence
parallel to European developments. Finally, a fourth group of procedural devices give, under completely different forms on the two sides
of the Atlantic, expression to the same basic policies: discovery devices
in the United States and the consecutive stages of proceedings in civilian
countries serve the same objective of a prepared and gradual approach
to the ultimate fact-finding.
Beyond the specifics of comparison, this look at American civil
procedure from a civilian viewpoint leads me to two more general
remarks. First, civil procedure has gradually risen to a distinguished
position within the legal system at large. What only fifty years ago
was essentially confined to "code pleading" and, later on, to dealing
with the "decisional forms," has now spread over to the constitutional
limitations of jurisdiction and admissibility of evidence, to moral issues
in discovery devices, and to the massive social implications of class
actions. These and similar questions, while still being characterized as
procedural, have embraced the totality of human and social behavior,
and increasingly supply paramount substantive considerations to the
workings of the judicial machinery. Thus, American civil procedure
tips the scales against the frequent allegation that in modern western
societies we are witnesses to the final victory of form over substance.
Of course, one has to question whether the goals sought can be fully
obtained through the judicial process alone; whether legal methods by
themselves are capable of bringing about major social changes. But
this question goes well beyond our present inquiry. An examination
of modern American civil procedure is at the same time a study in
the inherent limits of any regulation of societal affairs by means of
law.
The second general remark pertains to the intrinsic values of the
procedural rules themselves. It does not suffice to maintain that the
function of procedure consists in enforcing the law through truthfinding devices. For there remains the perennial dilemma: should a
system aim at a correct resolution of each individual dispute even at
the cost of evading some general principles, or should it rather aspire
to a reasonably general level of legal certainty and predictability even
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at the cost of sporadic individual injustice? American civil procedure
has reached the crossroads of this modern dilemma. As we have seen,
the approach to jurisdiction, discovery, and trial by jury seems to
follow individualistic preferences, while the law on the admissibility
of evidence, class actions, and appellate review is more receptive to
concerns for stability and general policies. The dilemma is endemic
and probably will never fade away. In the words of the Supreme Court
of the United States, "few answers will be written 'in black and white.
The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable.' -47

47. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 1697
(1978), quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 1216 (1948).

